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A SLASH-AND-BURN EXPEDITION THROUGH THE
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING

-

Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife
INTRODUCTION

In June 1992, at the historic Earth Summit in Brazil, Chief
Executive George Bush of the United States of America alienated
environmentalists around the world by refusing to sign a biodiversity treaty aimed at protecting the world's endangered species.'
Contemporaneously, the United States Supreme Court, with its decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' refused to hear the merits of a case concerning the proper enforcement of the Endangered
Species Act' partially because the Court felt that it is the exclusive
function of the executive branch to "take care that the laws be

faithfully executed."' 4 The plaintiffs in the case, believing that the
executive branch had in fact failed to take care that environmental
legislation was enforced, were predictably outraged.6 Environmentalists and commentators contended that the conservative Court,
led by Justice Antonin Scalia, was using the doctrine of standing to
keep environmental activists out of court.'
1. Director of the Environmental Protection Agency, William Reilly, assessed
world reaction: "The decision [not to sign] was the subject of intense controversy
and criticism ... we never recovered from it". EPA Chief Says He Was
Sabotaged in Rio; Earth Summit: Reilly Blames the White House for Undermining Its Delegation at the U.N. Conference in June, L.A. Ti.ms, August 2, 1992, at
Al.
2. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
4. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
5. As Brian O'Neill, counsel opposing the government in the Lujan case put
it, "This is disaster. It says that the Administration can thumb its nose at Congress, and it makes it nearly impossible to get into court to do anything about it."
David G. Savage, Court Upholds Bush Wildlife Policy Limits, L.A. TIMES, June
13, 1992, at Al. Partisan advocates were not alone in voicing this concern. The
dissent in Lujan called the decision "an invitation to executive lawlessness." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2157 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Justices Make it Harder to Press Environmental
Enforcement Cases, TH WASH. POST, June 13, 1992, at A4 ("It's going to make it
very, very difficult for citizens to get any kind of relief in court when the government decides to destroy the environment . . . This opinion, at its core, is just
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Standing is the legal term referring to the primary doctrine by
which the courts answer the simple question: Who may sue in federal court?' Though the question is clear and straightforward, the
answer to it depends upon the interpretation of a huge agglomeration of Supreme Court opinions 8 and a voluminous collection of
academic comment and criticism.9 This Note will not attempt to
synthesize the enormous spectrum of standing jurisprudence, nor
will it join in the obligatory, frantic forecasts of environmental disaster at the hands of an unresponsive government that will inevitably stem from the Lujan decision. This Note will evaluate the effect of Lujan on standing doctrine with a focus on its settlement of
unanswered questions remaining after the Supreme Court's penultimate standing case in the area of environmental law, Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation."
The Lujan decision will be assessed firstly, by summarizing
the decision in the Case section of this Note. Secondly, the Background section will explore the history of standing litigation with a
focus on cases with factual similarities to Lujan. This exploration
will include an analysis of the effect of the National Wildlife Federation [hereinafter NWF] case, thus demonstrating standing doctrine as it stood when Lujan was decided. Thirdly, in the Analysis
section, three key aspects of the Lujan majority opinion will be
analyzed, along with the dissenting and concurring opinions. This
analysis will lead to the realization that the era of liberal grants of
standing to environmental plaintiffs has come to an end, but will
also identify a glimmer of hope for potential environmental litigants. Finally, the Conclusion section will identify questions remaining to be resolved after Lujan.
hostile to any kind of environmental lawsuit.") (quoting Brian O'Neill).
7. Other doctrines limiting access to the federal courts, lumped with standing under the rubric "justiciability," include ripeness, mootness, and the political
question doctrine. Of these, standing is probably the most important. Cf. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("The Art. I doctrine that requires a litigant to
have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most impor-

tant of these doctrines.").
8. Over 500 Supreme Court opinions have been written concerning the doctrine of standing. See KENNETH CuLP DAvis, ADMmISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 24:1, at 208 (2d ed. 1978). Since 1970 the Court has written 74 opinions significant to the law of standing, an average of six per year. Id.
9. See Id. § 24:2, at 211 (noting that between 1970 and 1983 600 articles on
"Standing to Sue" were listed in the Index to Legal Periodicals).
10. 110 S.Ct. 3177.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act,1" to provide for
the protection of endangered or threatened species.1 2 Responsibilities under the Act are divided between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce.1" Section 7(a)(2) of the Act
requires every federal agency to consult with the relevant Secretary to ensure that any action funded by the agency is not threatening the existence of an endangered species.1 4 Initially, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce promulgated a
joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require consultation
when federal agencies authorized, funded or carried out projects in
foreign nations.15 After reconsideration, and a change of administration, a new rule was promulgated interpreting section 7(a)(2) to
require consultation only for federal agency action taken in the
United States or on the high seas. 6
Shortly thereafter, Defenders of Wildlife (hereinafter Defenders), an organization dedicated to wildlife conservation, filed suit
against the Secretary of Labor seeking a declaratory judgment that
the 1986 regulation was in error as to the scope of section 7(a)(2)
and an injunction requiring the restoration of the original rule extending section 7(a)(2)'s coverage to its original interpretation (i.e.
worldwide). Defenders' evidence included sworn affidavits and
deposition testimony that two of its members had visited sites of
federally funded development projects overseas for the purpose of
observing and studying endangered species.18
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988) [hereinafter ESA or the Act].

12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1992).
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)).
15. Id. at 2135 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978)).
16. Id. (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (1986)). The original rule was promulgated
under the Jimmy Carter administration. The 1986 reinterpretation occurred
under Ronald Reagan.
17. Lujan v. Defenders df Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1992).
18. The two members who submitted affidavits, Joyce M. Kelly and Amy
Skilbred, were wildlife biologists. Ms. Kelly had travelled to Egypt and Israel to
view the Eurasian Peregrine Falcon and the Nile crocodile, two species allegedly
threatened by the Aswan Dam project overseen by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Ms. Skilbred had been to Sri Lanka to study wildlife habitat threatened by
the U.S. Agency for International Development's Mahaweli Dam project. Both
women professed a desire to return to these sites, though neither had made specific plans. See Brief for the Respondents at 17, 18, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90 - 1424).
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The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Defenders had
standing.20 On remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the standing issue. The district court denied the motion,
holding that the Eighth Circuit had already decided the standing
issue, and granted Defender's motion for summary judgment on
the merits.2 1 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.2 2

The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, held that Defenders lacked standing to challenge
the regulation." The opinion addressed, and modified, four concepts of standing jurisprudence, each of which will be discussed in
the Analysis section of this note. Firstly, the Court held that respondents had failed to demonstrate the "injury in fact" required
to state a case or controversy under Article III.2 The Court stated
that Defenders members' claims that they planned to return to
threatened habitats were "simply not enough" to demonstrate a
concrete injury. 25 Secondly, the Court rejected Defenders' arguments in the alternative that their members were injured in fact by
the loss of a species due to loss of vocation or based on the delicate
interconnection of the biosphere or based on a particularized interest in the endangered animal. 2 The Court sardonically dismissed
these "novel" theories as being "inelegantly styled . . . beyond all
reason
and pure speculation or fantasy. ' 27 Thirdly, the Court

held that respondents had failed to show that promulgation of the
old rule would redress their alleged injury.21 Finally, the Court dismissed Defenders' contention that they suffered a "procedural injury" stemming from the ESA's citizen suit provision. 29 Relying
19. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987).
20.. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
21. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989).
22. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (1992).
24. Id. at 2136.
25. Id. at 2138.
26. Id. at 2139.
27. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1992).
28. Id. at 2140.
29. Id. at 2142. The citizen's suit provision of the ESA provides that "any

person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person,

including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter." 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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heavily on separation of powers principles, the Court held that a
plaintiff claiming a generalized grievance about government does
not state an Article III controversy.3 0 The Court held that, if Congress intended the citizen's suit provision to confer upon all persons the right to enforce the ESA by federal lawsuit, Congress acted unconstitutionally." Nearly six years after filing its lawsuit,
Defenders was precluded from presenting the merits of its claim
that the Secretary of the Interior was unlawfully threatening endangered species.
BACKGROUND

Article Ill of the Federal Constitution does not define the "judicial Power" but does limit the federal courts to hearing "cases"
or "controversies". 2 Neither "case" nor "controversy" has a plain
meaning, and no definition of the terms appears in the Constitution."3 Despite this fact the courts have used the case or controversy provision of Article III to construct the primary doctrine by
which the federal courts determine who will be permitted to sue the doctrine of standing."4
Justice Antonin Scalia, author of the Lujan opinion, has described the standing doctrine as "an answer to the very first question that is . . .rudely asked when one person complains of another's actions: What's it to you?"3 5 Though simple on the surface,
30. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
31. Id. at 2143, 2146.
32. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citing U.S.
CONsT. art. III §§ 1 & 2). Article III provides, in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising

under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;- to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;- to all cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;- to Controversies between two or more States;-

between a State and Citizens of another State;- between Citizens of different States;- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens and Subjects.
U.S. CoNsT. art. III at § 2.
33. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (noting that "an executive inquiry can bear the
name 'case'... and a legislative dispute can bear the name 'controversy' ").
34. In depth discussions of the doctrine abound. See, e.g., DAvis, supra note
8,§§ 24-36.
35. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential ElePublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
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"What's it to you?" has been a notoriously complicated question
for potential federal court plaintiffs to answer."6 Indeed, the doctrine of standing has been
described by the Court as "a word game
3' 7
rules.
secret
by
played
The rules of standing may be secret, but the words are now
very clear:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in-fact - an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.] Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be fairly
ment of the Separation of Powers, 17

SUFFOLK U.L.

REv. 881, 882 (1983).

36. The Supreme Court has labeled the standing doctrine "one of the most
amorphous concepts in the entire domain of public law." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 465, at 498
(Statement of Paul Freund)). A leading commentator has described the doctrine
as "permeated with sophistry." See Davis, supra note 8 at 342. Law review criticisms of the doctrine are too numerous to list. For articles particularly relevant to
this Note, see: Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
InadequateSurrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Sean Connelly, Congressional Authority to Expand the
Class of Persons With Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking,
39 ADMIN. L. Rv.139 (1987); David P. Currie, MisunderstandingStanding,1981
Su. CT. REv. 41 (1981); Kenneth C. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. CH. L. REV. 450 (1969-70); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposalsfor
CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court "Standing" Decisions, 13 VT. L. Rv.
675 (1988-89); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221
(1988-89); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1985); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causationas a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky.L.J. 185
(1980-81): Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. Rav. 68 (1984);
Michael A. Perino, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENvTL.AFF. L. REv. 135 (1987-88); Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and JudicialReview after Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 EcOLoGY L.Q. 335 (1991); Kenneth E.
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv.L. REv.
645 (1972-73); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1974-1975); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of
Standing; A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1976-77) [hereinafter Tushnet I]; Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to
Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1698 (1979-80).
37. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the
result of the independent action of some third party not before
the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.38
Though often applied to reach different results,8 9 these three elements are applied to all standing cases, including environmental
litigation.' 0
Thus, the Court has not explicitly enunciated a distinct standard for granting standing to environmental litigants. Despite this
fact, case law demonstrates that, until recently, the Court evalu41
ated the standing claims of environmental groups with solicitude.
Justice Scalia found the birth of this solicitude in a 1971 opinion
interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act,"2 in which
Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote:
[lit remains to be seen whether the promise of this legislation will
become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role. We must assess
claims that one of the agencies charged with its administration
has failed to live up to the congressional mandate. Our duty, in
short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in
the halls of Congress, are not lost8 or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.'
38. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992) (internal quotation marks, footnote and citations omitted).
39. Compare Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Article
IH requires, as an irreducible minimum, that the plaintiff allege (1) an injury that
is (2) 'fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct' and that is
(3) 'likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' ") (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984)) with Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (majority applying virtually the
same test to reach a different result).
40. See Perino, supra note 36, at 144 ("Standing in environmental litigation
follows the same basic analysis used in all standing questions.").41. See infra notes 53-98 and accompanying text. Presumably because standing jurisprudence is so fact-specific and manipulable, commentators have frequently analyzed standing cases in which environmental groups were plaintiffs
separately. See, e.g., Poisner, supra note 36, at 335 (noting that "environmental
groups have enjoyed relatively lenient standing scrutiny" and citing Perino supra
note 36, at 144-48); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 57 (1982)).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
43. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm'n v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge J. Skelly Wright was a well known defender of the
Court's role in actively promoting public policy. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, The
JudicialRight and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial Activism in
an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 487 (1986-87).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
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As Justice Scalia put it, "the judiciary's long love affair with environmental litigation" had begun."" While limiting standing in other

areas of the law,4 5 the federal courts of the sixties and seventies
relaxed standing requirements for individuals challenging environmentally threatening actions of the federal government. 6
An exhaustive analysis of this love affair is beyond the scope
of this note. An examination of four Supreme Court cases; Sierra
Club v. Morton,4 7 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),48 Duke Power v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group, Inc.,49 and Japan Whaling Association v.
American Cetacean Society5" will suffice to demonstrate the outer
limits to which the three elements of standing - injury in fact, causation, and redressability - have been stretched.5 Justice Scalia's
opinion in NWF,52 which dramatically revised standing doctrine as
applied to environmental litigation, will then be examined to reveal the doctrine of standing as it existed when Lujan reached the
Supreme Court.
44. Scalia, supra note 35, at 884.
45. See Steven M. MacFarlane, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
Standing, The APA, and The Future of Environmental Litigation, 54 ALB. L.
REv. 863 at n.2, (1989-90) (collecting standing decisions in which the Court constricted standing doctrine including: Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
46. See MacFarlane Note, supra note 45, at 863 n.1 (collecting authority to
support the proposition that the court's standing requirements were more lenient
in environmental litigation, including: GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIc NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 6.05(2)(a) (1991); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.6, at 23 (1977); David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands:
The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279,
330 (1982); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's EnvironmentalLaw Decisions, 42 VAND. L. Rv.
343, 406-07, 411-12 (1989)).
47. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
48. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
49. 438 U.S. 59 (i978).
50. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
51. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, 901 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Morton and SCRAP as
"landmark cases" and applying them liberally to grant standing).
52. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6

8

1993] Higley: A Slash-and-Burn
ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDING
Expedition Through
the Law of Environmental Stan

A.

Morton, SCRAP, Duke Power and Japan Whaling

In Morton, the Sierra Club [hereinafter the Club], an environmental protection organization similar to Defenders of Wildlife,
brought an action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment
and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving an
extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the
Sequoia National Forest. 53 The Club sued as a membership organi-

zation with "a special interest in the conservation and the sound
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the
country. ' ' 54 The Club asserted its standing under the judicial re-

view provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter
APA].5 5 Broadly, the court in Morton faced the question: What
may amount to an "injury in fact" sufficient to gain access to the
federal courts? More narrowly, the court faced two issues that were
critical to organizations seeking to vindicate environmental interests in the federal courts. Firstly, could a plaintiff obtain standing
without pointing to an injury to an economic interest or property
right?5 1 Secondly, could an organization claim standing for itself
57
based on a "special interest" in protecting the environment?
The first issue arose due to the fact that in Scenic Hudson
PreservationConference v. FederalPower Commission,58 the sec53. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
54 Morton, 405 U.S. at 730.
55. Id. The plaintiffs cited Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1989). Section 702 states that "a person suffering a legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id. In Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to require a plaintiff claiming standing under it to meet a two part test requiring, first, "that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise" Id. at 152,
and second, that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [be]
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153. This "zone of interest" prong
of the test is considered prudential, while the injury-in-fact prong is constitutionally based. Id. The Data Processing decision was roundly criticized. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, supra note 36 at 229 ("More damage to the intellectual structure of
standing can be traced to Data Processing than to any other single decision").
However, given the Court's approach in NWF, the "zone of interest" test is still
the proper standing analysis under the APA. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
56. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
57. Id. at 735.
58. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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ond circuit held that an interest in the environment was judicially
cognizable 59 , and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.60 This position was agreed with in dictum by Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp,61 but until Morton, the Supreme
Court had not expressly spoken on the subject. Though the Sierra
Club was ultimately denied standing, the Morton court very clearly
expanded the category of Article III injuries beyond traditional notions to include interests in the "aesthetics and ecology of a particular geographic area.

'6 2

The Court's full description of the injury

was as follows:
The injury alleged by the Sierra Club will be incurred entirely by
reason of the change in the uses to which Mineral King will be
put, and the attendant change in the aesthetics and ecology of the
area. Thus, in referring to the road to be built through Sequoia
National Park, the complaint alleged that the development
"would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural
and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the
enjoyment of the park for future generations." We do not question that this type of harm may amount to an "injury in fact"
sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the APA.
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being,
are important ingredients of the quality of life in -our society, and
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of
legal protection through the judicial process.63
Thus, for the first time, the Court explicitly recognized that an
aesthetic injury was sufficient to confer standing despite its generalized nature. The Club lost its case, but an important precedent
was set.
The second issue arose because the Club had specifically declined to assert the interest of a member, apparently hoping to establish an "organizational standing" rule. 4 The court rejected this
argument, holding that the Club lacked standing because it had
failed to allege that either it or its members were directly injured
59. Id. at 615-16.

60.
(1966).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
397 U.S. 150 (1969).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 735 n.8.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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by the potential ski resort. 5 Thus, environmental organizations
failed to gain "private attorney general status,"' 6 but it was now
clear that an intangible aesthetic interest in the environment
would be protected by the federal courts. 7
One year after Morton, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),6 8 the Supreme
Court relaxed the injury in fact requirement of the standing doctrine further, while also relaxing the redressability requirement.6 9
The plaintiffs in SCRAP were an unincorporated group of five law
students who challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission order approving a surcharge on rail transportation of scrap materials. 70 Basing their right to sue on the APA,7

the plaintiffs alleged

that the increased cost of using scrap materials would discourage
recycling, which in turn would increase litter, which in turn would
65. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The requirements for organizational standing were later clarified in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In Hunt, the court enunciated a three prong
test that must be met by an organization seeking to sue on behalf of its members:
"[A]n organization has standing to sue on behalf of its members if: (a) its members would otherwise *have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit." Id. at 343.
66. Morton, 405 U.S. at 737.
67. The decision was met with some criticism. See, e.g., Morton, 405 U.S. at
742 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450
(1972) and arguing that standing should be conferred on environmental objects to
sue for their own preservation). See also Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue -A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT. RnsouRcZs J. 76 (1973).
68. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
69. The SCRAP and Duke Power courts did not divide the causation and
redressability requirements into two elements. The Duke Power court saw the two
prongs as interchangeable. See Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (defining this step in the standing inquiry as requiring that
the "injur[y] 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant... 'or
put otherwise, that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress the
claimed injuries" and affirming the district court's finding of a "causal connection") (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976)). Though the exact language of the test differs from that used in Lujan,
the clash in spirit between the two holdings will be apparent. See infra notes 174183 and accompanying text. For ease of reference this aspect of the standing doctrine will be referred to hereinafter as redressability.
70. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 678. The surcharge on scrap materials would increase
the cost of using such materials. Id. at 676.
71. Id. at 685 n.12.
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pollute their local parks and recreation areas.7 2 The court ruled
that this was a sufficient allegation of injury in fact to survive a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing.7 3 The effect of the SCRAP
decision on the injury in fact and redressability requirements for

standing will demonstrate why it has become known as the high
water mark for environmental plaintiffs. 4
The SCRAP Court broadened the injury in fact test in two
ways. Firstly, the injury alleged by the students in SCRAP could
have been alleged by anyone living in United States.7 5 In holding
that the generalized nature of the injury did not defeat standing
the court said:
[W]e have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied
simply because many people suffer the same injury ... To deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many
others are also injured would mean that the most injurious and
widespread Government actions could
be questioned by nobody.
76
We cannot accept that conclusion.
72. Id.

at 678.

United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 690 (1973). The Court's complete description of SCRAP's
73.

injury is as follows:
It [SCRAP] claimed that each of its members "suffered economic, recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad freight structure, as modified by the Commission's actions to date in Ex Parte 281." Specifically, SCRAP alleged that
each of its members was caused to pay more for finished products, that
each of its members "julses the forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and
other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area
and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sight-seeing, and
other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses have
been adversely affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its
members breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and
the area of his legal residence and that this air has suffered increased
pollution caused by the modified rate structure, and that each member
has been forced to pay increase taxes because of the sums which must be
expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials.
Id. at 678.
74. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 36, at 145; MacFarlane Note, supra note 45
at 884-85; James M. Duncan, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Standing and the Two Million Acre Question, 23 PAc. L.J. 223, 230 n.57 (1991).
75. See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687 ("[A]ll persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed, all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here.").
76. Id. at 687-88.
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Secondly, the Court was willing in SCRAP to confer standing
based on a comparatively insignificant injury. In rejecting the government's contention that standing should be limited to those
plaintiffs significantly affected by agency action, the court quoted
Professor Kenneth Davis' statement that "an identifiable trifle is
11
enough for standing.
The attenuated chain of causation upon which SCRAP relied
is also remarkable. As the opinion phrased it:
[T]he Court was asked to follow a far more attenuated line of
causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees complained - a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased
use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable
goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to
produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken from
the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be'
discarded in national parks in the Washington area. The railroads
protest that the appellees could never prove that a general increase in rates would have this effect, and they contend that these
allegations
were a ploy to avoid the need to show some injury in
78
fact.
The Court rejected the railroads' protest, holding not only that potential littering in the Washington, D.C. area constituted a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing, but also that a sufficient
likelihood existed that an invalidation of a national rate increase
on recyclable materials would redress that injury.79
The Duke Power case served as a reiteration of the Court's
willingness, as in SCRAP, to confer standing despite a weak connection between the conduct of the defendant and the remedy
sought by the plaintiff.8 0 In Duke Power, the plaintiffs, environmental groups and individuals residing near two proposed nuclear
power plants, were given standing to attack the constitutionality of
the Price-Anderson Act. 1 The Price-Anderson Act limits nuclear
77. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 601, 613 (1967-68)).
78. Id. at 688.
79. Id. at 689 - 90. But cf. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177,
3189 (1990) (limiting the holding in SCRAP to evaluations of motions 'to dismiss
as opposed to motions for summary judgment).
80. Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-78
(1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
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power plant owner liability in the event of an accident.82 The court
granted standing on the theory that, without limited liability, the
plants could not be built and the plaintiffs would not be exposed
to "the environmental and aesthetic consequences of. . . thermal
pollution.""3 The defendant in the case argued that the plant
would be built without regard to the Act and that the redressability prong of the standing requirement was not met.84 The
court rejected this argument, accepting the lower court's finding
that without the protection of the Act the plants would likely not
be built.85 Thus the Court demonstrated a willingness to.stretch
the redressability element to reach the merits in this environmental litigation. As Justice Stevens put it in his concurrence, "It is
remarkable that such a series of speculations is considered suffi'
cient . . . to establish ... standing."86
To understand the significance of the Japan Whaling decision
a rather detailed examination of its facts is necessary. The dispute
in Japan Whaling arose due to the fact that Congress, in reaction
to the International Whaling Commission's (hereinafter IWC) inability to impose sanctions on nations in violation of its whale harvest quotas, passed legislation making the Secretary of Commerce
responsible for "certifying" nations in violation of the IWC's quotas. 7 Upon certification, the Secretary of State was then compelled
to order sanctions on the offending nation. 88 These sanctions consisted of at least a fifty percent reduction in the fish harvest allowable to the offending nation from the United States' "fishery conservation zone".8 9 When Japan violated an ICW whaling quota in
1984, the Secretary of State refused to certify due to an executive
agreement made with Japan.90 In response, various environmental
groups filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secre82. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 64-67.
83. Id. at 73.
84. Id. at 75.
85. Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 77 (1978).
86. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). See infra notes 174183 and accompanying text for the modern court's constriction of the redressability test.
87. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 225-26,
(1986) (detailing the enactment of the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988) and the Packwood Amendment to the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1988)).
88. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 226.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 227, 228.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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tary of State to certify Japan.9 1 The Supreme Court overturned a
lower court decision granting the writ, but the significance of the

decision with respect to this Note is the relative ease with which
the Supreme Court granted standing.2 Indeed, the court did not

even address the issue of standing in the text of the opinion but
rather dismissed the government's argument that the environmental groups lacked standing in a footnote.9 3
The court found it "clear" that the environmental groups
could avail themselves of a right of action under the APA.' Significantly, the court cited Sierra Club and SCRAP for the proposition
that the adverse effect on the "whale watching and studying" of
their members constituted a sufficient injury in fact." In addition,
the fact that the redressability prong of the standing inquiry was
not even mentioned9" indicated that the court considered the chain
of causation between a fifty percent reduction in the American
fishing alloted to Japan and redress of the plaintiffs' alleged loss of
enjoyment of the whale population sufficient to confer standing.
Due to the Court's cursory handling of the standing issue, conclusions as to the exact extent of injury required under this decision
are difficult to make. However, the favorable citing of Morton and
SCRAP, along with the ease with which the court granted standing
indicate that, as late as 1986, liberal standing for environmental
plaintiffs was alive and well in the federal courts.
Thus, after Japan Whaling, an environmental organization
with a grievance concerning harm to the environment could expect
to be granted standing liberally. All that would be required to meet
the injury in fact prong of the test would be a trifling, even purely
aesthetic, injury to one of its members.9 The fact that the injury
was a general one, shared by a wide segment of the public would
91. Id. at 228. The original plaintiffs in the action were: American Cetacean
Society, Animal Protection Institute of America, Animal Welfare Institute, Center
for Environmental Education, The Fund for Animals, Greenpeace U.S.A., The
Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for Animal Welfare,
The Whale Center, Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends
of the Earth, and Thomas Garrett, former United States Representative to the
IWC. Id.
92. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 240-41
(1986).
93. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 n.4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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not deny standing. 8 And, finally, even the most attenuated link
between the remedy sought and redress of the plaintiff's alleged
injury would confer standing." In 1985, with these expectations in
mind, the National Wildlife Federation [hereinafter the Federation] successfully protested the Bureau of Land Management's use
of public lands in the federal courts.1 00
B.

Lujan v.' National Wildlife Federation

1 ' the Federation,
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,"
an environmental organization dedicated to the preservation of
animal species, brought suit against the Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior and the director of the Bureau of
Land Management [hereinafter, collectively, the Government]."'0
The Federation alleged that the Government had violated the Federal Land Policy Management Act [hereinafter FLPMA],10 3 the
1 04
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter NEPA]
and APA section 10(e). 05 Broadly, the Federation alleged that illegal acts by the Government would result in mining activity on the
public lands which would destroy their natural beauty.1 06
To challenge these allegedly illegal acts the Federation would
have to meet the requirements for standing. First, since neither the
FLMPA nor NEPA contained a citizen suit provision, the Federation would be required to meet the zone of interest test from Asso107
ciation of Data ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp.
Secondly, as an organization, the Federation would be required to

98. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
100. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (detailing the
procedural history of the case).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3182.
103. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1988).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
105. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (citing section
10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)).
106. NWF, 110 S. Ct. at 3183-84. Specifically, the Federation objected to over
.one thousand "classification" changes and "withdrawal" revocations. "Classification" is the process by which the Department of the Interior determines which
public lands are suitable for disposal. "Withdrawal" is the process by which land
is exempted from disposal. See MacFarlane Note, supra note 45 at 891-93 (citing
43 U.S.C. § 315A (1988) and 43 U.S.C. § 17020) (1988)).
107. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also supra note 55 (APA standing requirements
as they stood when NWF was decided).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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meet the test from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission.0 " Finally, the Federation would be required to allege
an injury in fact to a member so as to avoid a decision as in Morton. 0 9 With SCRAP and Morton as their landmarks, 1 0° respondents were careful to file affidavits by two of its members alleging
that they used land "in the vicinity" of threatened land.'"
When the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the affidavits were sufficient to confer standing," 2 everything
seemed in order for the Federation's battle on the merits. Then the
Supreme Court granted certiorari."' In a five to four decision""
the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that
NWF lacked standing to challenge the Government." 5 The Court
first considered NWF's original affidavits and found that they
failed to set forth facts specific enough to demonstrate an injury
sufficient to confer standing." 6 The court examined standing as a
matter of interpretation of the APA. It set forth the test for standing under section 702 as requiring plaintiff to first identify the final
"agency action that affects him in the specified fashion," 117 and
then allege that he has "suffer[ed] a legal wrong" or been "ad108. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See also supra note 65 (text of the Hunt test).
109. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (discussing the standing
requirements of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).

110. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990) (noting
that the Federation placed great reliance upon SCRAP).
111. Id. at 3184. The affidavits were essentially identical. The specific language of one of them is as follows:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have
been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the, South PassGreen Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of
mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.
Id. at 3187.
112. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
113. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).

114. See Duncan Note, supra note 74 at 224 n.4 (detailing the change in
composition of the court between the SCRAP decision and the NWF decision).
The NWF majority was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, White, and Scalia. Dissenting were Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Stevens and- Marshall. Id.
115. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
116. Id. at 3188-89.
117. Id. at 3185 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2) (1988)).
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versely affected or aggrieved" by the agency action. " 8 The Court
found that under the standards for assessing a motion for summary judgment, the Federation affidavits were insufficient to confer standing" 9
The major effect of the court's decision was a narrowing of the
potential plaintiffs in an APA-based suit. The key passage in the
opinion states that, in order to overcome a motion for summary
judgment, averments by an environmental organization that one of
its members "uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining has occured or probably
will occur by virtue of the governmental action" are not enough to
confer standing. 2 0 The decision was not surprising, 2 ' but its sig-

nificant constriction of the requirements for standing "stunned environmentalists"' 22 and touched off a flood of commentary from
student authors across the country.'
118. Id. at 3186. Comparesupra note 55 (text of § 702 APA and the "zone of
interest" test from Data Processing).The NWF court did not cite Data Processing but it enunciated essentially the same test. Id. Thus, "the plaintiff must establish that the injury of which he complains (his aggrievement or the adverse
effect upon him) falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the
statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." Id.
119. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188-89 (1990). The
Court also rejected the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the additional
affidavits submitted by the Federation were sufficient to confer standing. Id. The
Court reasoned that, even if all six affidavits were considered together they could
not confer standing to challenge the "entirety of [the] so-called 'land withdrawal
review program.'" Id. at 3189. The court found that the land review program
could not be considered final agency action and that only individual classifications
and withdrawals could be considered sufficiently ripe for judicial review. Id. at
3189-91. This portion of the opinion, as it deals with the ripeness doctrine, 'is
outside of the scope of this Note. It does, however, demonstrate the recent constriction by the Court of access by environmental litigants to the federal courts.
For a more extensive discussion of this thesis see Edward B. Sears, Note, Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation: Environmental Plaintiffs are Tripped Up on
Standing, 24 CONN. L. REv. 293, 349-52 (1991).
120. NWF, 110 S. Ct. at 3189".
121. See supra note 114 (concerning the change in composition of the Court).
The conservative trend in environmental law decisions was noted in Phillip D.
Reed, Dialogue, The Supreme Court and Environmental Law: A Whole New
Ballgame?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,262 (July 1984).
122. Karin Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental
Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557,
10,557 (December 1990)).
123. See, e.g., Duncan Note, supra note 74; Bill J. Hays, Note, Standing and
Environmental Law: JudicialPolicy and the Impact of Lujan v. National Wildhttps://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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When certiorari was granted to hear the NWF case, an environmental law case in which the lower courts had couched the issue of standing in constitutional terms,' 4 the newly conservative
court's view of the constitutional minimum required for standing
was expected to be revealed. It was not. In writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia carefully avoided constitutional analysis, and, in
fact, never mentioned the word "standing" except when summarizing the procedural history of the case. 125 The decision was based
purely on interpretation of the APA.'25 Specifically, the court said
that the issue in the case was whether the two members of the
Federation had shown that their interests were "aggrieved" under
21
the meaning of the APA.
Thus, the optimistic .environmentalist could view NWF as
holding that standing under the APA should be more strictly construed,' 8 and not as a statement of the bare constitutional minimum required for standing. 2 " Also, under NWF, though SCRAP

was limited to its facts and to motions to dismiss, it was not overturned. 3 0 Thus, it could be argued that the relaxed requirements
life Federation, 39 KAN. L. REv. 997 (1990-91); Poisner Note, supra note 36; Sarah A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: The Supreme
Court Tightens the Reins on Standing for Environmental Groups, 40 CATm. U. L.
REv. 443 (1990-91); Sears Note, supra note 119; Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L.
Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs:Standing Doctrinein Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARv. ENVL. L. Rnv. 187 (1991); Stu
Stuller, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 62 U. COLo. L. Rav. 933
(1991); Michael J. Shinn, Note, Misusing ProceduralDevices to Dismiss an Environmental Lawsuit - Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990), 66 WASH. L. REv. 893 (1991); John Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the
Doors of Judicial Review, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REv.
136 (1991).
124. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 878 F.2d 422 (1989).
125. See Stuller Note, supra note 123, at 946.
126. NWF, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-94.
127. Id. at 3187.
128. Justice Scalia had previously indicated his desire to intensify standing
requirements under the APA. "I anticipate that the Court's SCRAP-era willingness to discern breathlessly broad congressional grants of standing will not endure." See Scalia, supra note 35, at 898.
129. See Hays Note, supra note 123, at 1040. ("ITihe second general observation that can be made with respect to cases decided in the aftermath of Lujan is
that the tendency of the courts to restrict their jurisdiction will be less in cases in
which standing is based upon a substantive statute and not the APA.")
130. The court's language was as follows:
The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would suffice
for § 702 review under its particular facts has never since been emulated
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for Article III standing that emerged in the seventies had not yet
been overturned. The Lujan opinion would prove both of these
theories wrong.' 1
ANALYSIS

A.

Discouragement for Environmental Litigants

In Lujan, the Court was faced with a case that was factually
similar to NWF, but, as the suit was brought under the ESA, 32 the
Court would not have the luxury of avoiding constitutional analysis by relying on the APA. Thus, in deciding Lujan the court dutifully set out the constitutional requirements for standing, and proceeded to obliterate the Supreme Court's approach to granting
standing in environmental litigation. 33 This obliteration resulted
in the unequivocal end of the era of liberalized environmental
standing. The three major fears of environmentalists that arose
from NWF became reality. First, the opinion severely constricted
the injury in fact requirement for constitutional standing.3 4 Secondly, the opinion brought separation of powers theory with full
13 5
force to hold that Congress cannot create a "procedural injury".
Finally, the relaxed redressability requirement of Duke Power may
have been overturned."' 6 Each of these developments will be dealt
with in turn.
1. Injury in Fact
With its opinion in Lujan, the Court shrunk the pool of potenby this court, is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the
pleadings.
NWF, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
131. See infra notes 132-183 and accompanying text.
132. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1992).
133. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2160. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling the decision a "slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing").
134. Id. at 2137-40.
135. Id. at 2142-46.
136. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42. This portion of the opinion was a plurality.
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun dissented from it, finding that there was a substantial likelihood that Defenders' injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 2154-57. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but made it clear
that he agreed with the dissent on the issue of redressability. Id. at 2149. Justices
Kennedy and Souter refused to reach the issue because injury-in-fact had not
been proven. Id. at 2146.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/6
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tial environmental litigants by stressing that the injury-in-fact
prong of the standing doctrine requires an "actual or imminent"
injury. 3 7 The NWF decision had made it clear that a plaintiff dissatisfied with government action who wants to seek relief from the
federal courts must prove an injury in fact with exacting specificity. 8' Affidavits alleging use of an area "in the vicinity" of the
threatened land would not confer standing."" 9 The "word game"
identified in the Harlan dissent in Flast was obviously being
played. 4 The plaintiff in Lujan interpreted the words "in the vicinity" to confer standing. 4 1 The government disagreed, arguing
"in the vicinity" was not close enough. 4" The government won the
game and commentators agreed that environmental plaintiffs were
now required by the United States Constitution to plead their
43
cases with strict geographical specificity.
With NWF undoubtedly in mind, the plaintiffs in Lujan submitted affidavits identifying specific research projects conducted
by members adjacent to specific lands threatened by government
action.'44 Additionally, the affiants professed an intent to return to
the research areas for further research. The Supreme Court held
that this was "simply not enough.' 45 The Court held that "some
day" intentions without specific allegations of when and how these
intentions would be realized could not confer standing. 46 It is now
clear that environmental plaintiffs must not only plead with exacting geographical specificity, but also must pinpoint the time of the
potential injury. Indeed, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that the affiants in Lujan should have purchased a plane
ticket. 147 In the hypothetical situation in which government action
unlawfully threatens to harm the environment in Antarctica, a
group such as Defenders of Wildlife will be required to identify the
exact site threatened and include a plan for visiting the site. The
137. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
138. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188-89 (1990).
139. Id.

140. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
141. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
142. Id. at 2135.
143. See Steuer & Juni Note, supra note 123, at 218; Sears Note, supra note
119, at 353.
144. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d 117, 120-21 (8th Cir. 1990).
145. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2146.
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public policy drawbacks of this requirement are obvious and have
been argued elsewhere, 4" but after Lujan, it is the law. No longer
49
will the "identifiable trifle" suffice for standing.
Defenders had also argued that they satisfied the injury in fact
prong of the test for standing due to three nexus theories: the
"ecosystem nexus" theory, which proposed that, due to the delicate
interconnection of the environment, even a distant elimination of
an entire species could cause injury; the "animal nexus theory,
whereby persons such as Defenders' members, who had a particular interest in preserving a species, were injured by the elimination
of that species anywhere in the world; and the "vocational nexus"
theory, whereby professional biologists, who make their living observing animals, are injured if the animals disappear, regardless of
location. 8 ' The theories had little foundation in existing standing
law, but were grounded in the growing scientific awareness that the
effect of the loss of a species can be very wide-ranging. 1 l Employing his now familiar caustic style,"8 " Justice Scalia dismissed these
theories summarily. Relying on the fact that "in the vicinity" was
not enough to confer standing in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,53 Justice Scalia insisted on a far tighter geographical
54
nexus than that argued for by Defenders.1

2. Separation of Powers
Not surprisingly, the opinion in Lujan has as its foundation
the idea that separation of the three branches of the federal government is the basis for the doctrine of standing. 5 Justice Scalia
148. See, e.g., Jeanne A. Compitello, Organizational Standing In Environ-

mental Litigation, 6 TouRo L. Rav. 295, 315-16 (1989-90).
149. See Macfarlane Note, supra note 45, at 917.
150. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1992).

151. Brief for the Respondents at page 21 (quoting scientific testimony that
"reducing the population in one area affects the population in its entirety, reducing the size of the gene pool and making it much more vulnerable to catastrophic
events").

152. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2139 ("Respondents'... theories are called, alas,
the 'animal nexus' approach ..
and the 'vocational nexus' approach.") (emphasis added).
153. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
154. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2139-2140.
155. A full analysis of the genesis of separation of powers theory in standing
law is beyond the scope of this Note. For Justice Scalia's scholarly exploration of
the philosophy of judicial restraint and the doctrine of separation of powers as it
relates to standing law, see Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C.
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had long ago expressed his distaste for the Court's pronunciation

in Flast v. Cohen15 6 that standing "does not, by its own force, raise
separation of powers problems related to judicial interferences in7
'15
areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government.
Justice Scalia theorized that this language led the courts away
from the theory that the duty to refrain from deciding generalized
grievances, established in Frothingham v. Mellon" and Ex Parte
Levitt, 5 9 was a constitutional duty based on separation of powers
theory.1 6 In Justice Scalia's view, cases such as SCRAP, Data
Processing and Barrow v. Collins,'6 ' in which the court granted
standing to hear generalized grievances, were a departure from the
constitutional mandate that the three branches of the federal government must remain separate. 162 Lujan was Justice Scalia's
chance to return "to earlier traditions"' 6 3 and he seized it accordingly. The most notable casualty in Justice Scalia's analysis was

the theory that Congress could grant standing with "citizen suit"
provisions."

'

Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. Rav. 345 (1978). Scalia's judicial
opinions written prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court are analyzed in
Sears Note, supra note 119, at 323-24. For comment critical of Scalia's views see
Poisner, supra note 36 (arguing that separation of powers theory inhibits the development and enforcement of public values which are paramount to the enforcement of environmental law). See also Daniel N. Reisman, DeconstructingJustice
Scalia's Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: The PresidentialExecutive, 53
ALB. L. RaV. 49 (1988-89) (arguing that Scalia's analysis of separation of powers
centralizes power in the executive branch). Reisman's view is shared by Justice
Blackmun, who took note in his Lujan dissent of the majority's "unseemly solicitude for an expansion of power in the executive branch." Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2159 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1969).
157. See Scalia, supra note 35, at 897 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 100-01).
158. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
159. 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
160. See Scalia, supra note 35, at 898.
161. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
162. See Scalia, supra note 35, at 897.
163. Id.
164. See Connelly, supra note 36, at 159 (arguing that Congress may grant
standing to rulemaking participants whose harm is the "denial of their rulemaking requests by an agency on grounds allegedly contrary to law"). See also supra
note 29 (text of section 1540(g)). Other federal environmental citizen suit provisions include: Toxic Substances Control Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270
(1988); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117, 30 U.S.C. 1427 (1988);
Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research,
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993

23

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 6
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:347

When Congress passed the ESA, they included within it a citizen suit provision. 5 The court of appeals, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,'" held that Defenders had standing based not only
on the affidavits of its members 67 but also on the basis of a "procedural injury" caused by the Secretary of the Interior's alleged
failure to comply with § 7(a)(2). 68 The court quoted the statutory
language that allows any person to file suit to enjoin any person
who is allegedly in violation of the ESA and pointed to the strong
Congressional intent to give "endangered species priority over the
'primary missions' of Federal agencies."' 69 The court held that
§ 7(a)(2) requires consultation and the Secretary had allegedly
failed to consult, the citizen suit created a right in environmental
groups such as Defenders to challenge the Secretary's improper
1 70
procedure in court.
Writing for a majority on this issue,inJustice Scalia reversed
the Court of Appeals. Justice Scalia resurrected Frothinghamand
Ex ParteLevitt and held that Congress could not "convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 §. 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Deepwater Port
Act of 1974 § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships

§ 11, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977 § 1449,
42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(1988); Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 335, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988);
Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978 § 725, 42 U.S.C. § 8435 (1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation
Act of 1980 § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9124 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988);
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 § 326, 42
U.S.C. § 11,046 (1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(a) (1988); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 § 19, 49 U.S.C. § 1686
(1988); and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 § 215, 49 U.S.C. § 2014
(1988). Obviously, Justice Scalia's conclusion that these provisions do not grant
standing for a "procedural injury" has wide-reaching implications.
165. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (1990).
166. 911 F.2d 117 (1990).
167. Id. at 121.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 121-22 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
170. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121 (1990).
171. See infra notes 185-209 and accompanying text (breaking down the decision). But cf. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (tempering
the harshness of Justice Scalia's opinion by pointing out that the Court "must be
sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs
in our common-law tradition").
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the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts. 1 1 2 Thus,
Justice Scalia clearly laid down a constitutional line of demarcation that would not allow Congress to create a right in the general
public to protest an agency action in the courts. If the citizen could
not afford the ticket to Sri Lanka required to meet constitutional
standing,17 3 the person would be relegated to influencing the Secretary of the Interior with her vote in the Presidential election.
3. Redressability
Finally, Justice Scalia took the opportunity in Lujan to suggest that the "redressability" prong of the test should be strictly
construed. Recall the tenuous line of causation between the alleged
injuries and remedies sought in the Duke Power and SCRAP
cases. 17 4 In Duke Power, the plaintiffs asserted that the Price-Anderson Act injured them in that it limited the liability of nuclear
power plant owners, which in turn allowed the power plant owners
to build plants, which in turn could pollute the water in the vicinity of the plaintiffs' homes. 1 7 5 In SCRAP, the plaintiffs asserted
that an increase in the transportation costs of scrap metal would
cause litter which would pollute parks "in the vicinity" of the
plaintiffs' homes.176 In both of these cases the court found that the
conduct of the defendant caused the injury and that the remedy
1 77
the plaintiffs sought would adequately redress their injury.
Despite these precedents, cited favorably as recently as
1986,178 a plurality of the court in Lujan17 9 held that an allegation
that the Secretary of the Interior had failed to consult with heads
of agencies partially funding projects that would decimate the habitats of endangered species did. not state an article III injury. The
172. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2143-45.
173. Id. at 2146. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that plaintiffs should
have purchased a plane ticket).
174. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
175. Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
176. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
177. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
178. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 226 n.4
(1986).
179. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (1992). Justices
Kennedy and Souter did not reach the issue of redressability. Obviously, then,
this portion of the opinion will not control future standing litigation. Still, the
movement away from the redressability standards is distinct and worth noting.
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prospects for redressability were held by the court to be too weak
because the question of whether the heads of the agencies would
be bound by the Secretary's consultation regulation was "open". s°
It could be forcefully argued that the question of whether the construction of the nuclear plants in Duke Power was affected by limited liability was "open" also. Additionally, the lower court in
Duke Power had found that limited liability was paramount in enabling the defendants to construct nuclear plants, thus ensuring
the requisite causitive link, and the Supreme Court deferred to
this judgment.'8 1 The lower court in Lujan had proclaimed that it
was "satisfied that an injunction requiring the Secretary to publish
regulations mandating that federal agencies consult on agency actions abroad would result in consultation, which in turn would
foreclose the possibility that serious harm to endangered species
will be overlooked."1 82 Though the lower court findings in Lujan
and Duke Power as to causation seem to be indistinguishable, the
Lujan plurality refused to defer to the lower court on the issue to
causation. Thus, the Lujan plurality stands for a tougher standard
of redressability and a departure from Duke Power. The last link
in the chain of liberalized standing law of 1970's may be broken. 188
B. Encouragement for Environmental Groups
The Lujan decision was not all bad news for environmentalists. Each written opinion provided encouraging language for nonHohfeldian environmental plaintiffs, 84 including Justice Scalia's.
Each opinion will be examined in turn.
1.

The Scalia Majority

The encouraging aspect of the Scalia opinion emerges when, in
passing, he endorses Morton's elevation of an "aesthetic injury" to
the article III level: "Of course, the desire to use or observe an
180. Id. at 2140.
181. Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74
(1978).
182. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2141 (quoting Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1043-44).
183. But see Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to
reach the issue of redressability).

184. For a discussion of the meaning of the term Hohfeldian plaintiff, see
Tushnet I, supra note 36, at 1708 ("A Hohfeldian plaintiff is one who has the
personal and propriety interests of the traditional plaintiff,, and [not] the representative and public interests of the plaintiff in the public action.") (quoting Flast

v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968)).
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animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a
1 85
cognizable interest for the purpose of standing".
With Justice Scalia serving as the driving force behind a newly
conservative Supreme Court's modification of the standing doctrine, commentators had expressed concern that a return to the
traditional "legal interest" test from early standing jurisprudence
was imminent.1 8 This fear was apparently unfounded. Though the
Court intensified the particularity with which this "aesthetic injury" must be pleaded,1 87 environmentalists could rest at ease, secure in the knowledge that they would not be required to buy a
home adjacent to land threatened by government action in order to
be heard in court.
2. Kennedy, Souter and Stevens Concur
A short concurrence written by Justice Kennedy and joined by
Justice Souter is significant in two respects. Firstly, though he
agreed with the majority's conclusion that Mss. Kelly and Skilbred
did not incur an Article IH injury, 8 8 Justice Kennedy concurred in
order to temper the harsh manner in which the majority dismissed
Defenders' "ecosystem nexus" theory. 189 Citing Japan Whaling,
Justice Kennedy said, "I am not willing to foreclose the possibility,
however, that in different circumstances a nexus theory similar to
those proffered here might support a claim to standing."19 0 When
viewed with the dissent and Justice Stewart's concurrence this aspect of Justice Kennedy's concurrence indicates that Justice
Scalia's harsh view of the "ecosystem nexus" theory is a minority
view.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy concurred to temper the
breadth of Justice Scalia's rejection of the "procedural injury" theory put forth by Defenders. Postulating that Congress has the
power to grant a cause of action to a group of people who did not
have one before, Justice Kennedy stated; "Congress must at the
very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
185. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (emphasis added).
186. See Sears Note, supra note 119, at 35.
187. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-40 (1992).
188. Id. at 2146.
189. See supra text accompanying note 27 (quoting Justice Scalia's sardonic
language).
190. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993

27

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 6
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:347

injury to the class of persons entitled to bring the suit."1 91 Thus, if
Congress were to enact a statute that identifies failure to consult as
an injury and identifies a class of persons entitled to*bring suit, for
example conservation organizations, a majority of the Court might
hold the statute constitutional.1 9
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment because he disagreed with Defenders on the merits of the case, but made it clear
that he did not agree with the majority's assessment of the standing issue.193 Justice Stevens engaged in the now familiar "word
game" and concluded that the real issue in the case was whether
Mss. Kelly and Skilbread were genuinely interested in endangered
species.194 Arguing that their interest was genuine, he concluded
that an Article III injury was present.9 5
3. Blackmun and O'Connor Dissent
The dissent in Lujan differed from the majority in two respects. Writing for Justice O'Connor and himself, Justice Blackmun first evaluated the evidence and concluded that Defenders
had met their burden of creating a genuine issue of fact both as to
injury in fact and as to redressability.9 He noted the genuine issue of material fact required to survive a motion for summary
judgment was "not a heavy burden,"1 9 7 then engaged the majority
in a round of Harlan's "word game"' 9 8 and concluded that Defenders had been injured.19 9 Additionally, the dissent took exception to
191. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2147.
192. This proposition assumes that the dissenters and Justice Stevens would
vote with Justice Kennedy on this issue. In light of the vigor of the disagreement
with Justice Scalia demonstrated by their opinions on this issue, this seems a safe
assumption. See infra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
193. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2148 (1992).
194. Id. at 2149.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 2151.
197. Id. at 2152 (citing FED. RuLE Civ. PROC. 56(c)).
198. See supra note 37 and acompanying text.

199. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2153 (1992). The dissent
raised this, thought-provoking hypothetical to demonstrate the flaw in the majority's injury standard:

Just to survive summary judgment, for example, a property owner claiming a decline in the value of his property from governmental action might
have to specify the exact date he intends to sell his property and show
that there is a market for the property, lest it be surmised he might not
sell again.
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the majority's off-hand dismissal of Defender's ecosystem nexus
test.20 0 The difference in the majority and minority opinions concerning this issue seems to lie in a fundamental difference in how
they view the world. It appears that the dissent has been influenced by modern scientific thinking concerning the interconnection
of the earth's ecosystem,0 1 while the majority mocks the idea that
environmental destruction in one corner of the world could affect
the entire earth. 0 2 Fortunately, as noted earlier, the Kennedy concurrence seems responsive to the theory that a plaintiff could sue
on an "ecosystem nexus" theory,2 03 thus the court would have a
five to four majority on this point.
Finally, the dissent takes exception to the breadth of the majority's rejection of a "procedural injury" theory.
It is hoped that over time the Court will acknowledge that some
classes of procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention
of a substantive, concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may
be able to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood
of injury just
2
through the breach of that procedural duty. 4
The dissent argues that Congress can create a statutory procedure
so enmeshed with the substantive harm that failure to comply with
the procedure creates an injury. 0 5 As this theory is not joined precisely by the Kennedy concurrence it is not as significant.2 06
The most striking aspect of the dissent may be the fact that
Justice O'Connor joins it. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion in
Allen v. Wright,20 7 a case that states that standing should be understood by a "single, basic idea - the idea of separation of powers." 20 8 Justice O'Connor did not write the dissenting opinion, but
the fact that she joins it, and thereby endorses language concluding that the majority opinion "reflects an unseemly solicitude for
an expansion of power of the executive branch . . . [and] . . .
amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of enviId. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

200.
201.
the area
202.

Id. at 2154.
Id. at 2154 ("Many environmental injuries... cause harm distant from
immediately affected by the challenged action.").
Id. at 2139-40.

203. See supra text accompanying note 190.

204. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2160 (1992).
205. Id. at 2160.
206. See supra notes 191-92.
207. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
208. Id. at 752.
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ronmental standing"2 0 9 indicates that she is not pleased with the
manner in which Justice Scalia has used separation of powers theory to keep environmentalists out of court.
CONCLUSION

"Generalizations about standing are largely worthless as
such." 10 Any conclusions concerning the law of standing must be
made with this famous caveat from Justice Douglas in mind. Yet
after Lujan it cannot be gainsaid that the federal judiciary's love
affair with environmental litigation is over. Three aspects of the
Lujan opinion lead to this conclusion.
Firstly, the requirements attached to the injury in fact prong
of the test for Article III standing have intensified. The strict geographical nexus added to the injury requirement in NWF has been
augmented with a strict requirement of imminence. The prudent
environmental organization seeking standing in the federal courts
to protect an area or species threatened by government action
must now identify the area threatened with particularity, allege a
relationship between that area and a member, and document plans
by that member to continue the relationship with that area.
Secondly, plaintiffs' attempts to meet the redressability prong
of the test for standing may now be more closely scrutinized. The
prudent plaintiff must assume that if the Court cannot clearly conclude that the remedy sought will redress the alleged harm the
case will not be heard. Thus, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff
should not only document the injury, but also carefully document
the redressability of the injury.
Finally, separation of powers principles are now inextricably
linked to the Article III requirements for standing. Despite academic criticism calling for a contrary rule Justice Scalia has realized his goal of paring Congress' power to create standing to enforce environmental statutes such as the ESA. A plaintiff
frustrated by the newly intense pleading requirements of the
standing test cannot temper them by arguing that, in drafting citizen-suit provisions, Congress intended to grant standing to the
general public to enforce the relevant statute.
It must be noted, however, that, as always occurs in standing
litigation, the Lujan case left crucial questions relevant to the doc209. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2159-60 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

210. Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
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trine unanswered. Three such questions stand out. First, do Justice
O'Connor's apparent switch and the language in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence (refusing to rule out all Congressional attempts to
grant standing) support the conclusion that a majority of the court
will not agree with Justice Scalia's reactionary views on separation
of powers theory as it relates to standing? Second, when Justices
Kennedy and Souter do reach the redressability issue will they join
in Justice Scalia's strict view of it? And, finally, to what extent can
an environmental plaintiff rely on the interconnection of the
ecosystem to prove injury given the dissent and concurrences in
the Lujan case? The answers to these questions will have to wait
for the next clash between environmental concerns and judicial restraint that will inevitably occur in the United States Supreme
Court.
Donald Strong Higley, II
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